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OPINION 
                     
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge.  
 Plaintiff-appellant Judson C. Brewer appeals the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his 
employer, Quaker State Oil Refining Corporation and Quaker State 
Corporation ("Quaker State"), on Brewer's Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEA") claim, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988), and the 
dismissal of his pendent state-law claim brought under Michigan's 
anti-discrimination statute, the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101-2804.  Because the record reflects a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Quaker State's 
asserted nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging Brewer are 
pretextual, we will reverse the district court's entry of summary 




 Brewer worked for Quaker State as a sales 
representative from 1968 until the time of his discharge in March 
1992, at the age of fifty-three.  He worked in the Pittsburgh 
office until it closed in 1989.  During the course of his 
employment in Pittsburgh, Brewer was supervised by two different 
division managers, Bruce Drummond and Michael O'Donnell.  During 
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their respective tenures, both Drummond and O'Donnell encountered 
certain problems with Brewer's performance.  For example, 
Drummond stated that Brewer's clients complained that they had 
run out of oil or had not seen their sales representative in some 
time.  In January 1989, O'Donnell placed Brewer on a ninety-day 
probation for similar performance deficiencies, including 
customer complaints about running out of oil, poor follow-up with 
projects, inaccurate and incomplete paperwork, short work days, 
and lack of organization.  Shortly after Brewer completed his 
probationary period, he was transferred to the Detroit division. 
 District Manager Paul Pfauser supervised Brewer in 
Detroit.  In 1990 Pfauser gave Brewer acceptable performance 
ratings, but criticized him for poor planning.  Pfauser advised 
Brewer that he needed to work more closely with his client 
accounts and set higher standards for himself.  At the end of 
1990 Brewer received a sales bonus for exceeding the company's 
sales quota for that year. 
 In May 1991, shortly before his second annual review 
under Pfauser's supervision, Pfauser notified Brewer that various 
facets of his performance required improvement.  Pfauser 
counseled Brewer to be more efficient, to follow-up with requests 
both from his customers and from management, and to improve the 
timeliness and completeness of his sales reports.  In his formal 
evaluation in June 1991, Brewer received marginal or unacceptable 
ratings in all categories.   
 In August 1991, Brewer was placed on a ninety-day 
probation for his performance deficiencies.  At that time, 
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Pfauser criticized Brewer for performing poorly in the areas of 
client communications and organization.  In December 1991, Brewer 
again exceeded the company's sales quota and received another 
bonus.  Brewer was the only salesperson in the Detroit region to 
receive such a bonus for both 1990 and 1991.   
 Brewer's personnel file for the years prior to 1990 was 
lost.  However, it is not disputed that Brewer's mean performance 
evaluation rating from 1987 through 1990 was "3" out of a 
possible "5", which translates into "competent" by Quaker State's 
performance standards.  Factoring in his evaluation for 1991, 
Brewer's overall average for 1987 to 1991 was 2.9. 
 At the end of the ninety-day probation, Pfauser 
repeated his concerns that Brewer was spending too little time in 
his territory and not adequately communicating with customers. At 
this time Brewer's probationary period was extended for an 
additional sixty days.  On February 18, 1992, Pfauser wrote a 
memorandum to Brewer documenting performance problems, including 
Brewer's misprocessing orders, and failure to advise his accounts 
of credit problems.   
 Brewer challenged Pfauser's appraisal, commenting that 
his performance had improved.  Brewer also has claimed that 
Pfauser was "nitpicking," and that the problems were the result 
of petty misunderstandings, or were not really problems at all. 
Nonetheless, in the days that followed the February 18, 1992 
memorandum, Pfauser sought and obtained approval to terminate 
Brewer's employment.  Brewer was discharged on March 9, 1992, and 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to 
review the final order of the district court, which exercised 
jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1343(a)(4), and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1367. 
 On review of a district court's grant of summary 
judgment, we apply the same test the district court should have 
applied initially.  Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 
727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when the admissible evidence fails 
to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c).  When the nonmoving party bears the burden of 
persuasion at trial, the moving party may meet its burden on 
summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party's evidence 
is insufficient to carry its burden of persuasion at trial. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 
2552-53 (1986).  Thereafter, the nonmoving party creates a 
genuine issue of material fact if it provides sufficient evidence 
to allow a reasonable jury to find for him at trial.  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 
(1986).  In reviewing the record, the court must give the 
nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. 
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Sempier, 45 F.3d at 727; Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 935 
F.2d 1407, 1413 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991). 
 
III.  
 The ADEA prohibits age discrimination in employment 
against any person over age forty.  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 
Because the prohibition against age discrimination contained in 
the ADEA is similar in text, tone, and purpose to that contained 
in Title VII, courts routinely look to law developed under Title 
VII to guide an inquiry under ADEA.  See, e.g., Maxfield v. 
Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 791 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 1057 (1986).  We follow the evidentiary framework first 
set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), subsequently refined 
in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981), and recently clarified in St. Mary's 
Honor Center v. Hicks, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
 In order to establish a prima facie case, Brewer must 
show that he: (1) is over 40; (2) is qualified for the position 
in question; (3) suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) 
was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to permit an 
inference of age discrimination.  Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 
45 F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995). 
This showing creates a presumption of age discrimination that the 
employer can rebut by stating a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment decision.  Hicks, __ U.S. at 
__, 113 S. Ct. at 2747; Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728.  The plaintiff 
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then has the opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's 
stated reason was not its true reason, but merely a pretext for 
discrimination.  Hicks, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. at 2747; Sempier, 
45 F.3d at 728.   
 
A.  
 The district court held that the disposition of this 
case turned on the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
analytical framework because Brewer had established a prima facie 
case of age discrimination, and Quaker State had articulated non-
discriminatory reasons for Brewer's discharge.  Brewer v. Quaker 
State Oil Ref. Corp., 874 F. Supp. 672, 681-82 (W.D. Pa. 1995). 
We agree with the district court's analysis up to this point.  It 
is undisputed that Brewer is a member of a protected class, was 
discharged by Quaker State, and was replaced by an individual not 
within the protected class.  Moreover, Brewer was qualified for 
the position of sales representative.  He worked as a Quaker 
State sales representative for twenty-three years.  During his 
last five years on the job, he received overall evaluations that 
translated into "competent" by Quaker State's performance 
standards.  Accordingly, Brewer has established a prima facie 
case of age discrimination. 
 Quaker State has also established legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for terminating Brewer's employment. 
Pfauser documented continuous performance problems, including 
poor follow-up on customer requests, poor communications with 
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clients and with management, too little time spent in his 
territory, and late and ambiguous sales reports.   
  
B.    
 We must next determine whether Brewer has met his 
burden of demonstrating that a factfinder could find that the 
allegedly legitimate reasons proffered for his discharge were 
only a pretext for discrimination in order to survive Quaker 
State's motion for summary judgment.  To defeat a summary 
judgment motion based on a defendant's proffer of 
nondiscriminatory reasons, a plaintiff who has made a prima facie 
showing of discrimination need point to some evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either: 
(1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reason; or 
(2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more 
likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 
employer's action.  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763-64 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  The factfinder may infer from the combination of the 
plaintiff's prima facie case, as well as its own rejection of the 
employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason, that the employer 
unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff and was merely 
trying to conceal its illegal act with the articulated reason. 
See Hicks, __ U.S. at __, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.  Thus, if the 
plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficient to discredit the 
defendant's proffered reason, to survive summary judgment the 
plaintiff need not also come forward with additional evidence of 
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discrimination beyond his or her prima facie case.  Fuentes, 32 
F.3d at 764. 
 To discredit the employer's proffered reason, the 
plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was 
wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether 
a discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the 
employer is "wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent."  Fuentes, 32 
F.2d at 765 (citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 
983 F.2d 509, 533 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 
88 (1993)).  Rather, the nonmoving plaintiff must demonstrate 
such "weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherences, or contradictions in the employer's proffered 
legitimate reason for its action that a reasonable factfinder 
could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer 
that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-
discriminatory reasons."  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (citations and 
internal quotations omitted.). See Ezold, 983 F.2d at 527 
("plaintiff has the burden of casting doubt on an employer's 
articulated reasons for an employment decision")(quoting Billet 
v. Cigna Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 828 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 Brewer has challenged Quaker State's asserted reasons 
for his discharge.  First, Brewer's own testimony disputed the 
significance of the problems raised by Pfauser.  While Brewer 
challenged the extent and degree of his deficiencies rather than 
their existence, Brewer testified to specific examples of 
Pfauser's errant or misplaced criticisms.  Such evidence amounts 
to more than his subjective opinion of his performance.  Second, 
10 
Brewer provided evidence that he had succeeded in selling oil for 
nearly twenty-five years in the employ of Quaker State, and for 
the last five years, he was rated "fully acceptable" by Quaker 
State in his evaluations.  Third, Brewer provided evidence that 
he received a bonus for surpassing his sales quota in 1990 and 
1991, and was the only salesperson in the Detroit region to 
exceed his or her sales quota for those years.  
 The district court discounted this evidence, reasoning 
that Brewer cannot pick and choose which employment standard he 
will meet.  The district court reasoned that "although 
plaintiff's average numerical rating and sales bonus may be 
somewhat contradictory with the fact of his termination, the 
court does not believe that they give rise to such 'weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or 
contradictions' in Quaker State's explanation that a reasonable 
factfinder could rationally find the explanation unworthy of 
credence."  Brewer, 874 F. Supp. at 682.  We disagree that the 
"somewhat contradictory" evidence does not demonstrate a triable 
issue of fact.  On summary judgment, it is not the court's role 
to weigh the disputed evidence and decide which is more 
probative.  Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731.  The fact that Brewer 
received a bonus three months before he was fired and was the 
only sales representative in the Detroit region who received such 
a bonus is contradictory to Quaker State's admission that the 
most important standard of job performance is sales.   
 Quaker State's Executive Vice President of Sales, 
William Marshall, stated that sales volume is "extremely 
11 
important in evaluating a salesperson," and represents "the best 
simple measure" of a salesperson's performance.  App. at 200, 
203.  Quaker State's counsel also acknowledged this fact at oral 
argument before this court.  Indeed, the volume of sales may 
always be the primary measure of a salesperson's performance. See 
Kiliszewski v. Overnite Transp. Co., 818 F. Supp. 128, 132 (W.D. 
Pa. 1993) (evidence that a person performed well in the 
traditional role of salesperson precluded summary judgment 
despite employer's claim that the plaintiff suffered from 
efficient time-management deficiencies).  To segregate job 
performance into the neat categories of sales and organizational 
skills defies the reality of the role of a salesperson in a 
company.   
 We recognized that an employer may have any reason or 
no reason for discharging an employee so long as it is not a 
discriminatory reason. 
[W]e do not sit as a super-personnel department that 
reexamines an entity's business decisions.  No matter 
how medieval a firm's practices, no matter how high-
handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken 
the firm's managers, the ADEA does not interfere. 
Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the employer 
gave an honest explanation of its behavior. 
 
McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (citations and internal quotations omitted).  An 
employer may have a legitimate reason for firing an employee that 
has nothing to do with that employee's performance of the core 
functions of his or her job.  Nonetheless, our role is to 
determine whether a factfinder could reasonably find that the 
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employer's stated reason is unworthy of credence.  In this case, 
Brewer's deficiencies pale beside his consistently good sales 
performance, inexplicably unaccounted for in his supervisor's 
negative evaluations.  A factfinder could find it implausible 
that Quaker State would have fired Brewer for such deficiencies 
when he was successful in the sole area identified by Quaker 
State's own performance incentive program -- sales. 
 In Ezold, 983 F.2d at 509, we held that a district 
court had erred in finding that the employer's explanation for 
denying a promotion to the plaintiff was pretextual.  The 
employer claimed that it had denied partnership to the plaintiff 
because of her deficiencies in the area of legal analysis.  There 
was no question that the plaintiff suffered from serious 
shortfalls in that area, although she had demonstrated success in 
other areas of the job.  It was also clear that the employer 
considered legal analysis to be the critical category of 
performance review.  The district court had questioned the wisdom 
of the employer's partnership standards, and we held that "[i]t 
was not for the district court to determine that Ezold's skills 
in areas other than legal analysis made her sufficiently 
qualified for admission to the partnership."  Id. at 528.  This 
case is distinguishable on its facts.  In Ezold, the plaintiff 
suffered deficiencies in the one area deemed critical by the 
employer.  Here, in contrast, Brewer had some problems in a few 
aspects of the job.  Yet, he performed well in the one area 
deemed by Quaker State to merit a performance bonus.  This raises 
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genuine issues about the credence of Quaker State's performance-
based explanation. 
 It is also questionable why a company would fire the 
only salesperson to receive consecutive annual bonuses in 
response to the same organizational deficiencies that the 
employer had tacitly accepted for over two decades.  During the 
twenty-three years that Brewer worked for Quaker State, he 
consistently sold a high volume of oil despite the repeated 
criticisms of other aspects of his job performance.  It was not 
until late in his career that Quaker State turned the criticisms 
of Brewer's performance into the basis for adverse action.  A 
reasonable factfinder could view Quaker State's belated reliance 
on these criticisms as evidence that tends to show pretext.  See 
Levin v. Analysis & Technology, Inc., 960 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir. 
1992) (employer's claim that plaintiff was terminated because of 
his "poor attitude" did not provide a basis for summary judgment 
where there was evidence that plaintiffs' "irascible nature had 
for many years been accepted by his co-workers and superiors"); 
Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424, 426-27 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(evidence supported a finding of pretext despite employer's claim 
that the plaintiff had "poor interpersonal skills as a manager" 
where the plaintiff "had been kept on as a supervisor for 14 
years despite his abrasive personality and because of his ability 
to produce"); Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 709 
(6th Cir. 1985) (fact that the employer had legitimate concerns 
with the plaintiff's performance at the time of his discharge was 
not determinative where that "same level of performance" had been 
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acceptable to the employer until its consideration of a protected 
criterion).  Brewer's testimony disputing the significance of the 
alleged problems, his twenty-three years of consistently good 
sales performance and recent merit bonuses cast sufficient doubt 
on Quaker State's contention that Brewer was discharged because 
of poor job performance in areas which the company had long 
overlooked or tolerated.0   
 Brewer has also provided evidence that in August of 
1991, Wanda Weaver, Quaker State's personnel manager, wrote a 
memorandum to Pfauser summarizing Brewer's performance for the 
last fifteen years.  In the memorandum Weaver noted that "Judd is 
53 years old, which presents another problem."  App. at 24.  The 
district court determined that this statement merely indicated 
Weaver's awareness that, if terminated, Brewer may file an age 
discrimination suit.  Although the jury may very well conclude 
that this remark merely reflects an awareness of Quaker State's 
legal obligations, the statement is also subject to competing 
interpretations.  Another reasonable interpretation is that 
Brewer's age was a "problem" for Quaker State.  On summary 
                                                           
0The dissent states that Brewer has "done nothing to rebut" 
Quaker State's proffered non-sales reasons for firing him. 
Dissent Typescript at 5.  The dissent has overlooked evidence of 
Brewer's testimony in which he related specific examples of his 
supervisor's errant or misplaced criticisms.  Such evidence 
amounts to more than his subjective opinion of his job 
performance.  Of course, unrefuted evidence was also presented 
that Brewer's past performance for twenty years was identical to 
that for which he was fired.  It was not until late in his career 
that the criticisms of Brewer's performance were turned into 
reasons for his termination.  This evidence goes directly to 
discrediting Quaker State's non-sales related reasons for firing 
Brewer.   
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judgment, we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party.  Drawing the inference in Brewer's favor, 
Weaver's statement tends to show a discriminatory animus.  In 
viewing the record as a whole, as we must, we conclude that the 
statement is probative, and should be submitted for a jury's 
consideration. 
 Brewer next produced evidence that in March 1990, Jack 
Corn, Chief Executive Officer of Quaker State, discussed two new 
executives in the company newsletter.  He stated, "two of our 
star young men in their mid-40s.  That age group is our future." 
App. at 26-27.  Brewer asserts that this remark is circumstantial 
evidence of Quaker State's preference for younger workers.  The 
district court determined that Corn's statement was a "stray 
remark, unconnected with and remote from the decision-making 
process which resulted in Brewer's discharge."  Brewer, 874 F. 
Supp. at 683. 
 We have held that stray remarks by non-decisionmakers 
or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely 
given great weight, particularly if they were made temporally 
remote from the date of the decision. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545.  We 
agree with the district court that the Corn statement is a "stray 
remark" made by a non-decisionmaker and temporally remote from 
the decision to terminate Brewer.  The comment was made almost 
two years before Brewer's March 1992 termination.  Brewer's 
supervisor testified that he could not recall ever seeing or 
hearing Corn's statement, and there is no evidence of a causal 
link between Corn's statement and Brewer's termination.   
16 
 Though the Corn statement should not be given 
significant or commanding weight, at trial, it may provide some 
relevant evidence of discrimination.  We have held that a 
supervisor's statement about the employer's employment practices 
or managerial policy is relevant to show the corporate culture in 
which a company makes its employment decision, and may be used to 
build a circumstantial case of discrimination.  See Abrams v. 
Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(discriminatory statements by nondecisionmakers properly used to 
build a circumstantial case of discrimination); Lockhart v. 
Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 54 (3d Cir. 1989) (same); 
see also Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 641 
(3d Cir. 1993) (court may consider as circumstantial evidence the 
atmosphere in which the company made its employment decisions).   
 Corn's statement may be used as evidence of managerial 
policy.  The remark was not an off-hand comment made by a low-
level supervisor.  Rather, the comment was made by the Chief 
Executive Officer in a written newsletter.  "When a major company 
executive speaks, 'everybody listens' in the corporate hierarchy, 
and when the executive's comments prove to be disadvantageous to 
a company's subsequent litigation posture, it cannot 
compartmentalize this executive as if he had nothing more to do 
with company policy than the janitor or watchman."  Lockhart, 879 
F.2d at 54.   
 Quaker State claims that Corn's statement should not be 
considered evidence at all because it is too innocuous.  The 
statement that the mid-40's age group is the company's future may 
17 
indeed be considered a truism -- the future of any business lies 
with its relatively young employees.  See, e.g., Smith v. Flax, 
618 F.2d 1062, 1066 (4th Cir. 1980) (statement that "future lay 
in the employer's young Ph.D's" was a truism, and not evidence of 
age discrimination.).  Quaker State further asserts that praising 
the youth does not indicate bias against more mature workers. 
See, e.g., Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 826 (1st 
Cir. 1991). cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 (1992).  While a 
factfinder could find Corn's comment too abstract to evince age 
discrimination, it may also be considered by the jury as evidence 
of the corporate culture in which the employment decision to 
discharge Brewer was made, and circumstantial evidence of age 
discrimination.  We conclude that the Corn statement is relevant 
evidence of age discrimination. 
 
IV. 
 Brewer next argues that the district court erred in 
refusing to draw an adverse inference from Quaker State's 
inability to produce Brewer's pre-1990 personnel file.  The 
general principles concerning the inferences to be drawn from the 
loss or destruction of documents are well established.  When the 
contents of a document are relevant to an issue in a case, the 
trier of fact generally may receive the fact of the document's 
nonproduction or destruction as evidence that the party that has 
prevented production did so out of the well-founded fear that the 
contents would harm him.  Gumbs v. International Harvester, Inc., 
18 
718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Charkasky Meat 
Co., 259 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1958). 
 For the rule to apply, it is essential that the 
evidence in question be within the party's control. Gumbs, 718 
F.2d at 96.  Further, it must appear that there has been an 
actual suppression or withholding of the evidence.  No 
unfavorable inference arises when the circumstances indicate that 
the document or article in question has been lost or accidentally 
destroyed, or where the failure to produce it is otherwise 
properly accounted for.  See generally 31A C.J.S. Evidence 
§156(2); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 177 ("Such a presumption or 
inference arises, however, only when the spoilation or 
destruction [of evidence] was intentional, and indicates fraud 
and a desire to suppress the truth, and it does not arise where 
the destruction was a matter of routine with no fraudulent 
intent."). 
 The district court found that the file was lost in 
connection with the death of Quaker State's in-house attorney, 
and was not destroyed intentionally.  Quaker State's in-house 
attorney died of a terminal illness after he took possession of 
the file.  Quaker State avers that it has continued to search for 
the file, but to no avail.  We cannot say the district court 
applied the incorrect legal standard, nor were its factual 
findings clearly erroneous.  The destruction or failure to 
produce the record could have been due to many reasons unrelated 
to the lawsuit.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 
550 F.2d 834, 843 (3d Cir. 1977) (refusing to draw an adverse 
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inference where destruction of a diary could have been unrelated 
to the lawsuit), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).  The 
district court properly refused to draw an adverse inference.   
 
V. 
 Brewer has also brought an age discrimination claim 
under the Michigan Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101-
2804.  The district court held that Brewer failed to establish a 
prima facie case on his state law claim because he provided no 
evidence that Pfauser, or any other decisionmaker at Quaker 
State, was predisposed to discriminate against Brewer on the 
basis of age.  Brewer, 874 F. Supp. at 687.   
 The evidentiary burdens for proceeding on an age 
discrimination claim under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act 
are the same as those used in ADEA cases.  McDonald v. Union Camp 
Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1990).  However, in contrast 
to federal law, under Michigan law a plaintiff may establish a 
prima facie case by demonstrating that: (1) he is a member of the 
affected class; (2) that some adverse employment action was taken 
against him; (3) that the person responsible for this adverse 
action was predisposed to discriminate against persons in the 
affected class; and (4) that the person responsible actually 
acted on this predisposition to plaintiff's detriment.  Pitts v. 
Michael Miller Car Rental, 942 F.2d 1067, 1070 n.1 (6th Cir. 
1991).   
 A plaintiff may also establish a prima facie case under 
Michigan law using the traditional federal law standard set forth 
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in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824.0   The 
McDonnell Douglas standard has been adopted by the Michigan 
Supreme Court.  McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 
1159-60 (6th Cir. 1990); Matras v. Amoco Oil Co., 385 N.W.2d 586, 
590 (Mich. 1986).  Therefore, Michigan law provides that 
establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination varies with 
differing factual situations, and the standard that best fits the 
factual allegations should be applied.  Matras, 385 N.W.2d at 
590; Lytle v. Malady, 530 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).  
 The district court erred in applying only the prima 
facie standard set forth in Pitts, 942 F.2d at 1070, and not the 
McDonnell Douglas standard, which more closely fits the facts of 
this case.   Accordingly, the district court's entry of summary 
judgment on the state law claim will be reversed for the same 
reasons that we will reverse the summary judgment entered on the 
ADEA claim.  
                                                           
0A prima facie case as applied in the age discrimination context 
requires a showing that the plaintiff: (1) was a member of a 
protected class; (2) was subjected to adverse employment action; 
(3) was qualified for the position; and (4) was replaced by a 
younger person.   
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:  I respectfully dissent.  I 
cannot agree that Brewer's evidence of his sales performance 
rebuts Quaker State's litany of specific reasons for termination 
sufficiently to raise a genuine issue of material fact.  I would 
affirm the district court.0 
 Unlike the majority, I believe that the district court 
analyzed the case properly and reached a correct result.  In 
particular, I disagree with the majority's rebuke that the 
district court weighed disputed evidence.  See Majority at    
[typescript at 10].  I conclude that the district court, in 
granting summary judgment, properly focussed on Quaker State's 
articulated reasons for termination and determined that these 
reasons were an adequate, non-discriminatory basis for discharge 
even when considered along with Brewer's acknowledged sales 
record.   
 Our summary judgment inquiry comes flows from the 
Supreme Court's decision in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
                                                           
0
 I have little quarrel with Parts I, II, III.A, or IV of 
the majority's opinion.  I disagree with Part III.B, and I would 
not reach Part V.  Because I would affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment for Quaker State on the federal claim, 
I would remand the state claims to the district court to 
determine whether jurisdiction should be retained pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 
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317 (1986), which applies equally to McDonnell Douglas 
discrimination cases.  See Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 
F.2d 1209, 1219 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1098 
(1989).  Under Celotex, the district court must evaluate the 
nonmovant plaintiff's evidentiary showing to determine whether 
the showing raises a genuine issue of material fact.  This 
court's past discussions of the degree of proof required to 
survive summary judgment in McDonnell Douglas cases have 
recognized the need for this type of evidentiary evaluation. 
Fuentes v. Perskie provides our most extensive treatment of the 
subject.  32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994).  "[T]o avoid summary 
judgment, the plaintiff's evidence . . . must allow a factfinder 
reasonably to infer that each of the employer's proffered 
nondiscriminatory reasons was either a post hoc fabrication or 
otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action (that 
is, the proffered reason is a pretext)."  Id. at 764 (citations 
omitted) (first emphasis added); see Sempier v. Johnson & 
Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir.) (adopting implicitly the 
"reasonable inference" standard), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 
S. Ct. 2611 (1995); accord Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 
50, 53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990); Sorba v. 
Pennsylvania Drilling Co., 821 F.2d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1019 (1988). 
 In Fuentes, we observed that "this standard places a 
difficult burden on the plaintiff."  32 F.3d at 765.  It requires 
the plaintiff to "present sufficient evidence to meaningfully 
throw into question, i.e., to cast substantial doubt upon, the . 
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. . proffered reasons[.]"  Id. (emphasis added).  Elsewhere, we 
have described the standard in similar terms.  See Seman v. 
Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 428, 431 (3d Cir. 1994) ("our standard 
requires consideration of whether or not there is substantial 
evidence in the record to support an employee's contention that 
'but for' his age he would not have been discharged" (citing 
Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 In the present case, Brewer did not cast doubt on 
Quaker State's proferred reasons, i.e., he did not allege that 
they were not true.  He contended instead that they were 
inadequate for discharge because he was a good salesman. 
 I cannot agree that Brewer's evidence meets the 
McDonald Douglas summary judgment standard.  His general 
performance evidence, considered in connection with Quaker 
State's specific reasons for discharge, is insufficient to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact; the inferences he draws from 
his remaining evidence are unreasonable.   
 The majority opinion provides a fair summation of the 
facts of this case.  Brewer was fired following a series of 
significant performance problems, such as letting his customers 
run out of oil and failing to complete or even file his 
paperwork.  To demonstrate that these reasons were pretextual and 
that the real reason for his firing was age discrimination, 
Brewer offered three principal pieces of evidence:  first, 
general performance evidence such as positive comments on 
personnel evaluations and a sales bonus for selling oil in the 
two years prior to termination; second, a personnel memorandum 
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written by Wanda Weaver, Quaker State's Manager of Employment and 
Compensation, and sent to Pfauser, Brewer's supervisor at the 
time, which summarized Brewer's personnel evaluations since 1975, 
approved a "performance plan" that Pfauser had submitted, and 
observed, "[a]lso, Judd is 53 years old, which presents another 
problem"; and third, a comment by Jack Corn, then chief executive 
officer of the company, in the company newspaper referring to two 
of his new "seconds-in command" as "two of our star young men in 
their mid-40s . . . [t]hat age group is our future . . .."   
 For clarity, I will analyze each of Brewer's 
evidentiary proffers independently.  Brewer's general evidence of 
acceptable job performance forms the nub of the case.  The Weaver 
memorandum and the Corn comment are far weaker and, I believe, 
insufficient to stave off summary judgment absent Brewer's 
evaluations and sales bonus.   
 Quaker State alleges that it fired Brewer for a litany 
of specific performance problems.  Brewer responds with generic 
evidence of his generally successful performance as a salesman. 
The majority believes that Brewer's showing reveals sufficient 
"weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or 
contradictions" in Quaker State's explanation to produce a 
triable issue of fact.  Majority at     [typescript at 10].  I do 
not agree. 
 Brewer's general evidence of good performance is 
insufficient to cast doubt on the specific and undisputed reasons 
for termination articulated by Quaker State.  Put simply, good 
salesmen get fired for non-sales related reasons.  Quaker State 
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proffered such reasons, and Brewer has done nothing to rebut 
them.  Good performance alone will not raise an inference of 
wrongful termination.  See Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 
F.2d 335, 343-44 (3d Cir. 1990) (observing that close proximity 
between positive evaluations and terminations will not 
necessarily raise an inference of pretext); Healy, 860 F.2d at 
1215 (noting that awards, commendations, and promotions do not 
suggest that countervailing weaknesses do not exist or would not 
be important in future evaluations).  Brewer's failure to carry 
out specific tasks is dispositive, regardless of his general 
proficiency.  Pierce v. New Process Company, 580 F. Supp. 1543, 
1546 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The absence 
of complaints about performance, the absence of earlier commands, 
and plaintiff's own opinion . . . are all irrelevant in light of 
the direct order . . . which plaintiff undeniably failed to carry 
out."). 
 Because Brewer failed to offer evidence that addresses 
Quaker State's reasons, summary judgment was properly granted. 
See Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish School, 
7 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming summary judgment where 
employee did not contest reason for dismissal); Turner, 901 F.2d 
at 344 (affirming summary judgment where "[the employee] has 
offered no evidence tending to show that serious and unattended 
problems did not exist within his jurisdiction or that [the 
employer's] other criticisms at the time of the . . . decision 
were unjustified."); Keller v. Bleumle, 571 F. Supp. 364, 369 
(E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that 
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employee explained deficiencies but did not contest them); see 
also Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming 
summary judgment where employee failed to rebut employer's reason 
of lack of qualifications); Spangle v. Valley Forge Sewer 
Authority, 839 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988) (affirming grant of 
summary judgment where employee presented no evidence to show he 
was qualified for the job). 
 Brewer's position in this case differs from previous 
cases where employees have used general performance evidence to 
rebut a proffered reason for discharge.  Although we have 
repeatedly recognized that employees can rely on evidence of good 
performance to show pretext, in those cases the employers have 
inevitably relied on poor performance as a reason for 
termination.  See, e.g., Waldron v. SL Indus. Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 
496 (3d Cir. 1995) (rebutting poor performance charge and charge 
of economic necessity); Sempier, 45 F.3d at 730 (rebutting with 
performance evidence where non-performance was sole reason 
given); Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1422 (3d 
Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991) (allowing 
employee to contest poor evaluation using testimony of co-
workers); Siegel v. Alpha Wire, 894 F.2d at 51-52 (rebutting 
charge of poor performance and disloyalty); Sorba, 821 F.2d at 
205 (rebutting charge of poor performance); Chipollini, 814 F.2d 
at 900 (rebutting charge of poor performance based primarily on 
credibility of employee).  Had Quaker State relied on poor sales 
performance as its reason for discharge, I would confidently join 
the majority in finding that reason rebutted and hence a 
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reasonable inference of pretext.  That is not the case:  Quaker 
State terminated Brewer because of specific failures and 
omissions, not because of generally inadequate performance. 
 Nevertheless, at some level of analysis, performance 
evidence will always be relevant.  Even though Quaker State did 
not rely on poor performance per se, we must still consider it. 
As we explained in a footnote in Fuentes, "a decision foolish, 
imprudent, or incompetent by comparison to the employer's usual 
mode of operation can render it implausible, inconsistent, or 
weak."  32 F.3d at 765 n.8.  Because firing an extremely 
qualified and effective employee could be "foolish, imprudent, or 
incompetent by comparison to the employer's usual mode of 
operation," the court on summary judgment must inevitably 
consider employee performance. 
 Brewer's performance evidence comes to naught.  Under 
our rule in Fuentes, unless the employer relies on poor 
performance as an articulated justification, the evidence of good 
performance must be sufficient to make the employer's decision 
appear "foolish, imprudent, or incompetent."  Neither Brewer's 
sales bonus nor his inconsistent, often mediocre, but 
occasionally complementary evaluations meet this burden.  See 
Turner, 901 F.2d at 343 (refusing to find issue of fact from 
employee's mixed reviews); Healy, 860 F.2d at 1215 (affirming 
grant of summary judgment despite generally positive and at worst 
mixed performance evaluations); see also Fowle, 868 F.2d at 67 
(discounting positive performance evaluations).  A company is not 
"foolish, imprudent, or incompetent" when it fires a salesman who 
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lets his customers run out of oil, fails to spend sufficient time 
in his territory, and consistently neglects his paperwork. 
 Moreover, in firing Brewer, Quaker State did not 
deviate from "the employer's usual mode of operation."  Fuentes, 
32 F.3d 765 n.8.  The majority suggests otherwise, claiming that 
"[i]t is also questionable why a company would fire [a] 
salesperson . . . in response to the same organizational 
deficiencies that the employer had tacitly accepted for over two 
decades."  Majority at     [typescript at 13].  This court has 
recognized that changes in circumstances can turn flaws that were 
previously overlooked into legitimate reasons for termination. 
See Healy, 860 F.2d at 1215, 1220 (discussing change in employee 
environment).  It was undisputed that Brewer's problems came to a 
head after his transfer to Detroit, where he encountered a 
supervisor who was hard on everyone and a stickler for rules. 
App. at 72a ("[Pfauser] is a cross the Ts and dot the Is type of 
person to the point of being almost a fanatic about it. Corporate 
policy was always first in line, . . . [a]nd it affected 
everybody out there.") (deposition of Judd Brewer). 
Contemporaneous with Brewer's termination, Brewer's supervisor 
fired a thirty-two year old salesman for almost identical 
deficiencies.  See Brewer, 874 F. Supp. at 686; cf. Waldron, 53 
F.3d at 499 (relying on evidence of double standard to reverse 
summary judgment).  Brewer experienced a change in circumstances 
after which his previous deficiencies were no longer accepted. 
There is no contradiction here. 
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 In an effort to create a contradiction, the majority 
makes much of Brewer's sales bonuses combined with a Quaker State 
executive's statement that sales volume is "extremely important 
in evaluating a salesperson."  Majority at     [typescript at 
11].  Unfortunately, the two propositions in the majority's 
constructed contradiction pass in the night.  Proposition A, that 
Brewer was fired despite good sales figures, simply does not 
contradict Proposition B, that sales volume is "extremely 
important in evaluating a salesperson."  Descriptives such as 
"extremely important" and "best simple measure" show that sales 
volume is one important factor to the company, indeed one very 
important factor to the company, but they do not show that sales 
volume is the only important factor to the company.  Absent this 
final alternative, Brewer could have had more than acceptable 
sales numbers and still be fired for cause without contradiction. 
 The majority next suggests that "[t]o segregate job 
performance into the neat categories of sales and organizational 
skills defies the reality of the role of a salesperson in a 
company."  Majority at     [typescript at 11].  In addition, it 
finds in Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 
509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 
88 (1993), the concept of a job's "critical area," implying that 
a company which fires an employee despite acceptable performance 
in that critical area automatically raises an inference of 
pretext.0  These arguments dress the same contention in different 
                                                           
0
 I note in passing that to the extent Ezold stands for 
the proposition that an employee who falls short in a critical 
10 
clothes.  To paraphrase the argument, the majority claims that 
selling is what salesmen do, so firing a salesman who sells is 
inherently pretextual. 
 I cannot agree.  The "reality of [a salesperson's] 
role," and the "critical area" of a job are simply not helpful 
concepts.0  See Perry v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 738 F. 
Supp. 843 (D.N.J. 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d 696 (3d Cir.), cert 
denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990) (affirming summary judgment for 
employer despite showing that terminated employee excelled in 
core skill of underwriting).  Both concepts attempt to establish 
a general ideal of "performing the job" such that any contrary 
reason given by the employer conflicts with that ideal.  In doing 
so, the majority adopts the very posture of "super-personnel 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
area of performance can be terminated despite demonstrated 
success in other job areas, it does not follow that an employee 
cannot be terminated for failures in other job areas despite 
success in a critical area.  
0
 A brief hypothetical reveals the difficulties with 
these ideas.  An associate in a law firm excels at legal 
research, the "critical area" of his job.  Yet on several 
occasions, this associate fails to send documents to an important 
client.  He also consistently neglects to record his billable 
hours and maintain other mundane aspects of law office paperwork. 
Although some partners accept these foibles, the associate 
eventually encounters a more particular supervising attorney who 
seeks and obtains his termination.  Assuming that the associate's 
subsequent suit for discriminatory discharge reached the pretext 
stage, I have little doubt that this hypothetical associate could 
not rebut the employer's specific reason for termination with 
general evidence of good performance in the critical area of his 
job.  Nor could some elusive vision of the "reality of a lawyer's 
role" aid him in linking inextricably his failings in 
correspondence and paperwork to his more successful forays in the 
firm library.  Such evidence of good performance would not raise 
an inference that the employer's reasons for termination were 
pretextual.  Indeed, such evidence would be entirely consistent 
with the reasons given for termination. 
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department" that it all too strenuously declines.  Majority at    
[typescript at 11].  The majority defines the essence of a sales 
position and evaluates Brewer's performance against that 
standard.  I would save this court the task of redefining 
Brewer's job description to include only those requirements that 
he could meet.  We should instead look to whether his good sales 
performance was inconsistent with his reasons for termination.  I 
find no contradiction and no reasonable inference of pretext. 
 It also bears noting that in firing Brewer, Quaker 
State committed none of the questionable acts which we have cited 
in the past as indicative of pretext.  Brewer's performance 
problems were long-standing and well documented.  See Healy, 860 
F.2d at 1215 (discounting performance based inferences where 
complaints were long-standing and the employee had been informed 
of their nature); Billet, 940 F.2d at 827 (same); cf. Colgan, 925 
F.2d at 1422 (stressing that evaluations were a surprise and that 
ratings became aberrationally low when employee refused to 
retire).  He never contested these evaluations prior to 
termination.0  There was no evidence of corporate machinations or 
a plot to transfer Brewer and set him up for termination.  Cf. 
Waldron, 56 F.3d at 496-97; Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 772-74. Brewer 
offered no statistical or testimonial evidence indicating that 
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 This fact makes Brewer's claim of pretext sound like a 
post hoc explanation.  Although the post hoc concept is typically 
applied to the employer's reason for terminating the employee, it 
is equally valid here.  Just as post hoc timing indicates the 
employer's reason is pretext, see Waldron, 56 F.3d at 498; 
Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731; Fuentes 32 F.2d at 764; Siegel v. Alpha 
Wire, 894 F.2d at 55, it similarly undermines Brewer's claim. 
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Quaker State had discriminated against similarly situated 
parties.  Cf. Siegel v. Alpha Wire, 894 F.2d at 55. 
 In my view, Brewer's performance evidence fails to 
reach the quantum required by Fuentes.  He has not presented 
"sufficient evidence to meaningfully throw into question, i.e., 
to cast substantial doubt upon, [the defendant's] proffered 
reason . . . (e.g., by painting them as weak, implausible, 
contradictory, or incoherent)[.]"    32 F.3d at 765.  Indeed, he 
has presented no evidence indicating that his employer did not 
act for its asserted non-discriminatory reasons.  The record 
shows Quaker State's reliance on his failure to meet work 
requirements to be adequate, plausible, consistent, and 
coherent.0 
 Having addressed the sufficiency of Brewer's general 
performance evidence, I now turn to the two other items that he 
proffers, the Weaver memorandum and the Corn comment.  For both 
items, the inference of discrimination that Brewer hopes to draw 
is unreasonable "in light of competing inferences."  Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). 
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 As we have so often observed, McDonnell Douglas cases 
are inherently fact-specific.  Billet, 940 F.2d at 828 
("discrimination cases are inherently fact-bound"); Healy, 860 
F.2d at 1215 ("each ADEA case must be judged on its own facts"). 
My rejection of Brewer's showing would not foreclose the success 
of some future performance-based challenge to termination, either 
where the employer relied on poor performance as one of its 
justifications or where, as per Fuentes, the employee's 
performance is sufficient to make the employer's decision appear 
"foolish, imprudent, or incompetent."  See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 
764 n.7 (explaining that employee need only cast doubt on certain 
employee reasons).  Brewer's evidence, however, does not meet 
this burden, and the grant of summary judgment was proper. 
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 As to the Weaver memorandum, I have little to add to 
the analysis of the trial court.  Brewer, 874 F. Supp. at 683-84. 
Brewer greatly amplified the impact of Weaver's "[age] presents 
another problem" statement by repeatedly quoting it out of 
context.  When the letter is read as a whole, it becomes apparent 
that an inference of age discrimination is not reasonable.0  The 
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 To properly evaluate the statement, it must be 
understood as written.  This extensive quotation places the 
comment in context: 
 
The performance plan that you outlined . . . 
is excellent.  It is important that you 
identify specific deficiencies [in Brewer's 
performance] and the results desired by 
management. 
 
At this point in time, I would recommend that 
you identify specific monthly dates when you 
two can get together and discuss results over 
the previous thirty (30) days.  The results 
of those meetings should be summarized in 
letter format and Judd should sign the letter 
to acknowledge receipt.  It is also important 
that we provide Judd with written notice of 
action that will be taken if the problems are 
not corrected.  I suggest summarizing your 
meeting of August 19, acknowledge receipt by 
Judd, and close the letter by stating, "I 
must emphasize to you that your failure to 
permanently improve your work performance may 
lead to more severe discipline, up to and 
including discharge." 
 
Attached for your review is a brief summary 
of Judd's performance appraisals over the 
last 15 years.  I am disappointed that action 
was not taken years ago to correct these 
problems.  It is apparent from the 
performance appraisals that he has had 
ongoing performance problems throughout his 
employment history. 
 
I am obviously concerned that we have to take 
this type of action after 23 years of 
14 
district court drew the only reasonable conclusion:  "The 
statement as to Brewer's age being a 'problem,' together with the 
notations of his age and years of service, obviously indicate 
Weaver's awareness that Brewer might file an age discrimination 
lawsuit if terminated."  Id. at 684. 
 From the tone of the sentence and its placement in the 
memorandum, it is clear that Brewer's age militates against his 
firing.  The comment appears in a separate paragraph from the 
discussion of Brewer's employment problems.  Moreover, in 
Weaver's unrebutted deposition testimony, she stated that 
standard procedures were followed in requiring documentation of 
Brewer's performance while on probation and that she highlighted 
Brewer's age to alert his supervisor to his protected status and 
to ensure that age was not the reason for termination.  Id.; see 
Perry v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 843, 849 
(D.N.J. 1989) (holding that age data on various employment 
records was used for computing employee's pension, not for the 
purpose of discrimination), aff'd, 904 F.2d 696 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990).  The district court correctly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
employment.  Also, Judd is 53 years old, 
which presents another problem.  However, 
within the next ninety (90) days, it is 
extremely important for you to document as 
much as possible in the event his performance 
does not improve. 
 
Please forward each letter for our personnel 
file in Oil City.  I will stay in touch with 
you to see what progress has been made . . .. 




concluded that nothing supported an inference of discrimination, 
a conclusion that is all the more valid in light of Brewer's long 
history of employment problems. 
 As to the Corn comment, it expresses a truism that I 
would deem to be a stray remark by a non-decisionmaker.  Even if 
it were to be considered relevant, I do not believe that it would 
create a material issue of fact sufficient to warrant a denial of 
Quaker State's motion for summary judgment.  See White v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(considering similar comments); Perry v. Prudential-Bache Sec. 
Inc., 738 F. Supp. 843, 849 (D.N.J. 1989) (same), aff'd 904 F.2d 
696 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948 (1990).  I will not 
dwell on it further. 
 I conclude that, viewed as a whole, the record contains 
nothing that casts meaningful doubt on Quaker State's proffered 
reason for Brewer's discharge.  "While plaintiff is 'entitled to 
every favorable inference,' he is not entitled to build a case on 
'the gossamer threads of whimsy, speculation and conjecture.'" 
Keller v. Bluemle, 571 F. Supp. 364, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 
735 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 I do not believe that Brewer has made the showing 
necessary to survive a motion for summary judgment.  Because I 
would affirm the district court, I respectfully dissent. 
